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No. OTR-3

SUPPORT SERVICES HISTORY

(TITLE OF PAPER)
<u>HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF TRAINING</u>
<u>MARITIME TRAINING</u>
(PERIOD)
<u>1949 - 1954</u>

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HISTORY
of the
OFFICE OF TRAINING

MARITIME TRAINING (1949 - 1954)

Prepared by: Robert B. Shaffer, May 1969 (b)(3)

Approved by:

DTR

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
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INTRODUCTION

The efforts made during the period 1949-1954 to establish a training program in support of clandestine maritime operations are worth relating in some detail because they provide an excellent illustration of the difficulties that were encountered at that time in what was essentially a pioneering effort. It so happens that the files of that period are almost intact, thereby providing a well documented case history of the problems of establishing a new training program in those early days of the Office of Training.

Although OSS had used swimmers and small boats for some clandestine operations, the know-how was largely lost with the break-up of OSS in 1945. The OSS instructors and training sites were likewise lost, and such training materials as survived were out of date and not entirely pertinent to the post-war situation. As a result, operations officers as well as training officers were faced with formidable problems in terms of requirements, personnel, and facilities when it began to seem in 1949 that some kind of maritime training would be needed.

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CHAPTER I. The Beginnings of Maritime Training

1. Early Attempts to Identify Requirements

By March, 1949, the new Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)

had an Acting Chief of Training [redacted] and two (b)(3)

Training Officers [redacted] and James Cross). There is (b)(3)

evidence that some thought was already being given to maritime (b)(3)

training: in a memorandum of 23 February 1949 to [redacted] (b)(3)

Mr. Cross reported his researches on the OSS Maritime Unit Training Programs, summarizing the content of a six-weeks Basic Course and an eight-weeks Advanced Course.

By August 1949, [redacted] had been hired as (b)(3)

Chief of a proposed OPC "Advanced Course," which would be primarily paramilitary in nature. Shortly after, the training units of OSO and OPC were amalgamated to form the Training Division (TRD) under (b)(3)

[redacted] On 25 May 1950, the Deputy Chief of (b)(3)

TRD [redacted] joined [redacted] in a meeting with Commander (b)(3)

Charles Smith (USN) and [redacted] of Staff II, OPC, to learn (b)(3)

the extent of a so-called amphibious program that they had heard about, and to find out what would be expected of TRD.

Nothing further seems to have happened until 5 July 1950, when [redacted] wrote a significant memorandum to the Chief of (b)(3)

Staff II, OPC [redacted] asking for a conference to provide (b)(3)

guidance to TRD on anticipated maritime training requirements and effective training methods. [redacted] pointed out that a year (b)(3)

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would be needed to recruit and train personnel for a maritime unit, and suggested that ten men be recruited as soon as possible, to be trained as an expandable nucleus which could be used for training and research in maritime techniques. TRD had only two positions for naval personnel; [redacted] USN, was

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being processed against one of them to conduct a maritime orientation of about six hours, in the so-called Area Training Program.

[redacted] emphatically pointed out that TRD badly needed (b)(3)
to find out the following:

- a. OPC requirements in the maritime field (both for peace and for war);
- b. TRD's responsibility for maritime equipment;
- c. staff relationships and procedures;
- d. the requirements for facilities and equipment;
- e. the requirement for use of Navy training facilities.

The Training Division was still searching for definitive answers to these questions a year later.

[redacted] reported for duty in August 1950. He was (b)(3)
assigned the responsibility of getting maritime training started. It was clearly a frustrating experience for him. TRD asked OPC in December 1950 to give [redacted] authority and approval to hold (b)(3)
discussions with the Navy on maritime training matters. Approval was granted the following February. TRD prepared a set of proposals for training which it submitted to Staff II, OPC on 27 December 1950. A reply dated 27 January 1951 indicated that Staff II was engaged in computing over-all requirements for services support of OPC training

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programs, and expected to complete this study by 1 March; it stated that [redacted] estimate of ten Naval personnel for maritime training was reasonable and suggested he start procurement action. [redacted] spent this period preparing various studies for the organization and employment of a maritime training branch, and aired his frustration in several "progress" reports to [redacted]

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[redacted]
On 25 January 1951, for example, he wrote that he had learned that OPC had taken no positive action and that it had no concrete ideas regarding either the use of maritime operations or of the related training. He felt that to delay the commencement of the creation of a training program until after over-all requirements had been established would be a serious error because of the loss of lead time as well as the unfounded guesswork on which the estimates would be based. He doubted that anyone in OPC appreciated the potential of maritime operations, and showed his irritation with bureaucratic delays by quoting from a memorandum submitted by a naval officer to General Donovan under similar circumstances: "This office has suffered a great deal by having to go through a large number of channels, none of which had any experience in our field and merely delayed the prosecution of our work."

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[redacted] spelled out the problems in detail in a memorandum of 18 April 1951 to Chief, TRD. As of that date, no estimates of training requirements had been received. There still was no answer from OPC regarding the comprehensive proposals of 27 December 1950. He had been unable to determine the situation regarding the

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procurement of the military personnel requested for his unit.

He could not find out what maritime operations had been conducted in the recent past, what ones were contemplated, where and with what kind of equipment, personnel, or targets. He was forced to conclude that a

"deplorable condition of ignorance, indifference, lack of coordination, and ineffectiveness with regard to maritime operations prevails throughout the operating divisions. All efforts on my part to solve and improve the situation have resulted only in a circuitous return to my office confused and empty handed."

He felt that the lack of communication and coordination within the Agency represented an impossible situation, and recommended in effect that the maritime training program be abandoned unless some concrete positive actions were taken to determine the requirement and to procure the necessary personnel.

2. The First Organization and Staff

[redacted] first proposal for the establishment of a "Maritime Training Branch" had called for [redacted] positions, [redacted] (b)(3) of which were to be filled by Navy officers on active duty. This group was to conduct research, get trained, prepare to give training, and establish an organization that could be readily expanded if needed. By February 1951, [redacted] (b)(3) was planning in terms of a unit of [redacted] (b)(3) people. As the situation continued to change, other tables of organization were prepared. On 14 November 1951, [redacted] (b)(3) (successor to [redacted] (b)(3) requested the CIA Director of Personnel to allocate an additional [redacted] (b)(3) Naval officers and [redacted] enlisted men to the Maritime Training Unit in addition to the [redacted] (b)(3)

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officers already authorized. [redacted] memorandum further stated that this number represented about [redacted] of the total number of men who would be required for the training program which was expected to begin in November 1952. But two months later, in January 1952, [redacted] proposed that the T/O be reduced to [redacted]

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In any case, the acquisition of qualified individuals proceeded slowly. [redacted] reported in June 1951; [redacted] [redacted] USN, and [redacted] USNR, both underwater demolitions instructors, reported in September 1951, and [redacted] [redacted] AUS, arrived in October 1951. In a memorandum of mid-October 1951, [redacted] pointed out that the shortage of personnel in the Branch was becoming an "exceedingly acute" problem.

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As for any training to be conducted before a full staff was assembled, [redacted] had found out by February 1951 that the Navy Department was willing to help, if it received a statement of requirements, including either a list of Navy courses the trainees were to complete or the skills the trainees were expected to acquire. [redacted] visited the Naval Amphibious Base at Little Creek, Virginia during 24-26 April 1951, and learned that the Base had been instructed by the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, to be prepared to provide training as requested by CIA, and that this had been authorized by the Chief of Naval Operations. Base personnel indicated their willingness to implement any training requests within their capabilities; they could integrate Agency people into regular courses, or let

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them attend selected portions of regular courses, or conduct special courses if necessary. They could not, however, accept any one who was not a U.S. citizen. They reiterated their need for a statement of requirements.

In a memorandum dated 14 June 1951 and addressed to the Staff and Division Chiefs of OSO and OPC, Rolfe Kingsley (acting Chief of the Training Division) summarized the maritime training situation up to that date. Four kinds of training seemed to be needed:

- a. small boat handling and operation;
- b. underwater demolitions and swimming;
- c. amphibious and beach intelligence;
- d. general orientation.

For the time being, he said, this need would be met through use of the facilities at Little Creek, where arrangements had been made to enter a few Agency people (under cover) in a two-week course which was being run every few months for Naval Reservists.

This course, (which was later called [redacted] by OPC/FE) (b)(3)

had trainees from the Agency in June and September 1951 and in a few subsequent runnings.

In view of the confusion regarding requirements and actual (b)(1)
field operations, first-hand knowledge was obviously desirable. (b)(3)

[redacted] accordingly spent the period 25 July - 30 August (b)(3)
1951 visiting several field installations in [redacted] and [redacted] to
observe some actual maritime operations. His trip report pointed (b)(1)
out what he considered to be woeful deficiencies both in the (b)(3)

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support and in the conduct of maritime operations. He recommended changes in headquarters organizations, and called again for a survey of present and future requirements for training and equipment, as well as for the assignment of experienced officers to (b)(1) (b)(3) Training Division. He also had taken positive action while on this trip. While in [redacted] he had gotten two maritime case officers [redacted] and [redacted] interested in joining the Maritime Training Branch, which they later did.

After [redacted] return, most of the rest of 1951 was devoted to the planning and installation of maritime facilities at the new domestic training base [redacted] which was expected to be ready for occupancy by November 1951. Here was a different kind of problem; in this instance, the requirement had been made clear. The plans called for [redacted] to receive general paramilitary training by 30 June 1952; some kind of maritime training was to be included. [redacted] pointed out in a memorandum of 7 November 1951 that [redacted] was not suitable for some aspects of maritime training, and that decisions had to be made as to the best way to meet the requirements not only for this training but for research and development as well.

In reality, this huge group of students never materialized. Nevertheless, the requirement had been presented, and it constituted a strong argument for the establishment of a maritime training base.

Other maritime training requirements were beginning to come in at this time. The Maritime Training Branch received firm

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requests from OSO and OPC for the following training in 1952:

(b)(1)
(b)(3) underwater sabotage - [redacted]

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[redacted] maritime operations - [redacted]
[redacted]

3. The First Training

One specific requirement had emerged by this time from a series of discussions between representatives of the covert Offices and of Training. This was for a "Maritime Operations Staff Course" for case officers who would have to plan, direct, or support maritime operations, rather than actually participate.

[redacted] had submitted a detailed proposal for such a course in April 1951. It was to be a one-week course, given at Headquarters.

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On 30 September 1951, the OPC Training Officer signified that OPC had a requirement for such a course; on 16 October 1951 the OSO Training Officer asked that such a course be developed. On 30

October, [redacted] directed [redacted] who had just joined the Maritime Training Branch, to develop and present this course.

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The pilot running (one-week duration) began on 21 January 1952 for [redacted] selected OSO and OPC staff officers. Three years had elapsed since James Cross had researched maritime training for the Chief of Training, OPC. Staff Maritime Operations Course #1 then was presented 17 March 1952.

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Another specific request occupied much of the time of Messrs.

[redacted] and [redacted] during January and February 1952.

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[redacted] case officers from Foreign Division S (FDS) of OSO were given training in the techniques of clandestine infiltration and

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exfiltration. This involved a week of tutorial orientation in Washington, two weeks at Little Creek, followed by a week of training on a PT boat. The PT boat was a reconditioned one belonging to FDS; when representatives of the Maritime Training Branch saw it, their reaction was one they later described as "hopeful but somewhat skeptical." Arrangements had to be made for renovation and shakedown trials, as well as for temporary Navy ownership of the boat; special financial and requisitioning procedures had to be set up. The Navy provided a boat crew, equipment, a base at Little Creek, and cover; the training was successfully accomplished by mid-February. But [redacted] concluded from this experience that the severe problems imposed by conducting such training on an active Navy base were too limiting. On the other hand, the Agency did not have the staff, the equipment, or the training areas to do a proper job.

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Some training requirements caused problems at this time by leading other elements of the Agency to take action without the knowledge of [redacted] or anyone else in the Office of Training. In a memorandum of 2 January 1952 to the Acting Director of Training (Covert), [redacted] said that several months previously, FE/OPC had initiated independent negotiations with the Naval Amphibious Base at Little Creek for special training (i.e. [redacted] for some of its people. This venture had resulted in considerable confusion and embarrassment before the situation was rectified.

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In another instance, at the instigation of this same unit

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(FE/OPC), the Military Personnel Division (MPD) had persuaded the Navy to agree to put [redacted] Navy officers through Underwater Demolitions Team (UDT) training at Little Creek, after which they would be assigned to CIA. The time, place, and nature of the training happened to conflict with other arrangements which had been made by [redacted] independently. In his memorandum, [redacted] made a strong plea for the coordination of training requests through one focal point, particularly where Navy assistance was needed, to avoid duplications of requests and over-commitments.

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4. The Search for a Maritime Training Base

These events and situations, as they developed in the latter part of 1951, plus the expanding estimates of the number of students to be trained, led to serious consideration of the acquisition of a site where maritime training, tailored to the needs of the Agency, could be conducted effectively and securely. This move was almost inevitable as a precedent had been set. The Training Division, faced with a similar problem in the staging of paramilitary training, had selected a site for this activity in May 1951 [redacted] and begun construction in the following October. This site, however, was not considered suitable for maritime training; it lacked, for example, surf conditions and suitable beaches.

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The identification of a suitable site proved to be difficult. An undated study of the problem, compiled at about this time, listed the requirements which a suitable site had to meet, and discussed possible locations.

Northeastern United States was considered basically unsuitable

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by this study because of climatic and hydrographic conditions. The Chesapeake Bay area offered no location which even came close to meeting the needs. Several bases in Virginia and North Carolina were seriously considered, but again the physical conditions were not right. Jacksonville, Fort Pierce, and Key West, as well as the west coast of Florida, were all considered, but ruled out not only for physical reasons but also because of the overcrowded beaches and towns.

The Bahamas were rejected because the fact that they were British territory would mean international negotiations and increased security hazards. Cover and logistics would also present severe problems. The Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay did not have sufficient space, and the weather was too good to be considered favorable. The rest of the Caribbean--Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Vieques were considered but rejected because of the difficult logistic problem, poor security conditions, unfavorable weather and hydrographic features, as well as the problems relating to local labor.

The Gulf of Mexico was not seriously considered because of known undesirable features. The coast of California was scrutinized closely, but suitable places were too built up and too heavily populated. The one place that came closest to meeting all the requirements was [redacted]

Not only did [redacted] have the right conditions; the owner was known to be willing to make the land available at reasonable cost, and already existing structures and utilities would reduce

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the cost of necessary construction. Furthermore, it would appear that activation of a base would materially improve the local economic situation and promote a favorable reaction from the local populace.

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CHAPTER II. Project [redacted]

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1. First Interest in [redacted]

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The Office of Training then proceeded to take the steps necessary for acquiring this site as a training area. It first ascertained that a requirement for training actually existed. On 19 February 1952, the Acting Assistant Director for Special Operations reported that OSO expected to have [] students in 1953 and [] in 1954. On 18 February 1952, the Acting Assistant Director for Policy Coordination reported an expectation of [] students in 1953, and [] in 1954 (this included both agents and staff employees).*

The case for acquiring a specialized site was strengthened by a requirement of the Technical Services Staff (TSS). Its Research and Development Division wanted a site it could use in connection with the development of special equipment and operational techniques.

[] visited St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands in early March 1952 to acquaint himself with the UDT equipment being used by the Atlantic Fleet and to survey that island as a possible site

*These forecasts were to change many times in the next two years-- generally downward. The papers relating to numbers of students to be trained are confused and inconsistent. Two years after the above estimates were made, the Clandestine Services Training Committee (on 4 February 1954) had [] "prospective" students available for maritime training before 1 June 1954.

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for maritime training. It was judged undesirable because the weather did not present a variety of conditions and adequate security could not be established.

2. Chronology of the Acquisition of [redacted]

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On 21 March 1952, the proposal for a maritime training base was presented to the Project Review Committee. According to the report to the DCI dated 24 March 1952, the Committee raised three questions during the presentation:

a. What is the over-all need for special maritime training? The Committee recognized that clandestine maritime operations play an important role in supporting certain activities, and concluded that the line divisions of OSO and OPC had submitted realistic requirements.

b. Are trainees available? The Committee determined that a sufficient number of headquarters employees and returnees would be available to justify the establishment of the planned training area.

c. [redacted]

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In light of these considerations, the Project was approved. It

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would be necessary, of course, to secure appropriate support from the Navy, which had not yet been approached (the first contact was on 4 April 1952).

The history of the Project, which was assigned the code name [redacted] is best reviewed by drawing the sequence of events from [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) the weekly reports compiled within the Office of Training.

26 May 1952 - The Deputy Director for Administration

(DDA) has signed the letter to be sent to the Department of Defense, detailing the support that will be needed from the Navy Department.

16 June 1952 - The office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) is still studying the statement of support needed by the Agency. An official reply from CNO will have to wait for a policy decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on the training of aliens.

23 June 1952 - Rolfe Kingsley (the Deputy Director of Training, Special) has met at length with officers in the office of the CNO to work out an agreed basis for the Navy to provide cover and logistics support. The JCS have approved the inclusion of aliens in the project. A lengthy discussion has led to an agreement that the project can be established within the framework of the [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3)

4 July 1952 - The CNO has directed the Commandant of [redacted]

[redacted] to provide cover and support.

14 July 1952 - Messrs. Kingsley, [redacted] (Chief of the OTR Support Staff at that time) leave for the West Coast for a

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conference with the Commandant of [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)21 July 1952 - A memorandum to the Director of Training

(Mr. Baird) from Mr. Kingsley summarizes the accomplishments of meetings in [redacted] on 16 and 17 July. [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted](b)(1)
(b)(2)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)8 August 1952 - A memorandum formalizing the Agency position

and requesting certain actions is transmitted to the CNO.

8 August 1952 - [redacted] reports on his participation in a maritime training project staged by the SR Division in [redacted] for some agents (the so-called [redacted]). [redacted]

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feels that the effort was poorly planned, quite confused in the execution, and carried out under the wrong conditions with the wrong equipment. He had previously written (on 26 June 1952) a lengthy and detailed account of a running battle with SR Division over this training and his participation in it, where the confusion over who was responsible for what was so great that the Chief of the SR Division finally decided it should do the training without [redacted]

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is convinced as a result of this experience that training of this kind must be done under Maritime Training Branch control,

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and in an MTB area.

14 August 1952 - A meeting is held with CNO and Bureau of Ordnance (BuOrd) representatives, at which it is agreed that CNO will designate BuOrd to control the provision of support for the Project.

15 August 1952 - A meeting is held with [redacted] a representative of the owner, to discuss arrangements for the lease of the property.

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27 August 1952 - [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

5 September 1952 - Further conferences have been held with the owner regarding the lease, and with the [redacted]
[redacted] on procedures.

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(b)(3)

12 September 1952 - The Office of Training (Special) and BuOrd have worked out cover arrangements for the architectural and engineering survey which BuOrd expects to conduct during the last week of September at [redacted]

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(b)(3)
(b)(3)

17 September 1952 - [redacted] enters on duty as prospective Officer-in-Charge of [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

September 1952 - An undated Project Outline which appears to have been drafted in September 1952 describes the objective of [redacted] to be

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"to provide a program for training and development in the clandestine maritime field so that CIA will

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have the capability for effective prosecution of clandestine maritime executive and support operations. This objective is in direct furtherance of the mission of the Office of Clandestine Services (sic) and the related responsibility of the Office of Training and the Technical Services Staff."

This paper estimates the cost for FY1953 at [redacted] (b)(3)

and for FY1954 at [redacted] It calls for a staff of [redacted] (b)(3)
including [redacted] civilian instructors and [redacted] military instructors. (b)(3)

1 October 1952 - [redacted] enters on duty as prospective (b)(3)
chief instructor.

3 October 1952 - The table of organization is approved in part.

Approval of remainder is withheld, pending final approval
of the project.

20 October 1952 - A one-week Maritime Orientation Seminar begins
for [redacted] individuals from NE Division and [redacted] from Air- (b)(3)
Maritime Division (AMD).

31 October 1952 - An architectural and engineering survey of
[redacted] was conducted during the period 13-22 October by (b)(1)
Navy Public Works officers accompanied by the following
Agency representatives [redacted] (b)(3)
[redacted] and [redacted] of OTR, accompanied by (b)(1)
(b)(3) (b)(3)
Mr. Chandler, the Chief of Real Estate and Construction.

Their cost and time estimates for the rehabilitation of the
base have been submitted. The Air-Maritime Division is
making a re-study of the requirements of the operating
divisions of the Clandestine Services. The Secretary of
the Navy has approved the establishment of the Navy activity

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at the site as requested.

4 November 1952 - Efforts to obtain data from AMD on requirements are reported "unfruitful." The Project is to be submitted to the Director for a final decision on 26 November, inasmuch as the owner of the site has requested a decision by 1 December 1952.

20 November 1952 - A group of PP, PM, and FI officers meet to determine the extent of a requirement for [redacted] Some OTR officers attend as observers.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

21 November 1952 - On this date Mr. Walter Reid Wolf, the Deputy Director for Administration, addresses a memorandum to the Director of Training requesting that no further expenditures be made in connection with the acquisition of the [redacted] site without his approval. As a result of the survey party's findings in October 1952, he is convinced that a complete restudy would be advisable, in view of the difficulties regarding staff housing in the area and other problems surfaced by the survey.

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21 November 1952 - The Director of Training airs his frustration in his weekly report to the Director:

"The Office of Training feels that it has done about all it can in attempting to meet CIA requirements for a Maritime training site. At the request of authorized operating office officials, and based upon firm requirements for maritime training, OTR has spent nearly two years in locating and negotiating for a suitable training site and developing courses of training, in recruiting a specialist corps of instructors, and in conferences with Navy Officials from the CNO down. The PRC approved the project in March 1952.

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The DCI authorized further exploration and negotiation.*

"We have received complete Navy approval and cooperation. We have the site; we have detailed cost figures on construction, equipment and operation. But as of 20 November 1952, there still seems to be no clear cut basic policy decision on:

- (1) Whether CIA is to engage in Maritime operations;
- (2) Whether CIA will train personnel to man such operations;
- (3) Whether CIA will establish and maintain a maritime training school.

OTR cannot make these decisions."

26 November 1952 - Navy officers in the Maritime Training

Branch ask to be released for return to the Navy. Request granted.

9 December 1952 - On this date, the DDCI meets with the DDP, the DDA, the Chief of PM, the Director of Training, and members of their staffs. There is no disagreement as to the need for a maritime training school in CIA. The site already selected is confirmed, and in view of the urgent need to get the lease negotiated as soon as possible, the DDCI directs that this be done. Procurement of personnel is to be recommenced. Lists of costs and equipment are to be reviewed by the DD/A in preparation for submitting the

*Other memoranda make clear that the DCI not only authorized this, but ordered it. The cost estimates in the original OTR proposal were rough figures only; for lack of suitable cover, OTR officers had not been able to look at the site in detail, but had to rely on a general statement from the owner as to charges and length of occupancy. The DCI had therefore made his approval contingent upon the answers to two questions: (1) the extent to which the Navy will support the project; (2) how much money is actually required, based on estimates obtained by an on-the-spot survey.

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project to the DCI. The DD/A raises several questions:

Is there a better site somewhere else? Can this activity be located at [redacted] Will the use of [redacted] present a critical housing problem to the staff and dependents?

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(b)(3)

The Director of Training states that [redacted] does not provide the required water conditions, and that extensive surveys have not found any better location than [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

12 December 1952 - A lengthy meeting is held on this date by members of the Office of Training and of the Office of Procurement and Supply. The Chief of Procurement and Supply (James Garrison) says that he has been given this project and told to proceed with the leasing of the property, so he wants to hear what it is all about. Mr. Kingsley reviews the entire history of the efforts to date.

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[redacted] He also says that there are a number

of sticky problems coming up in connection with proposed construction.

7 January 1953 - A memorandum of this date from DTR to DCI,

concurred in by the Chief of Administration for DD/P and

by the DD/A, requests approval to go ahead with [redacted]

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at an estimated cost of [redacted] for FY53 and [redacted]

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for FY54, subject to review of all construction contracts

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and other major expenditures by the DDA. Implementation of Project [redacted] is approved by the DCI (Gen. Smith) on 7 January 1953. Navy is informed that CIA expects to be ready to accept previously selected Navy personnel as they become available. The first increment is due to report about 1 February.

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(b)(3)

16 January 1953 - A memorandum for the record of this date,

signed by [redacted] of the Office of the General Counsel, describes the lease which has been signed on 8 (or 9?) January. It was negotiated in [redacted] by the Chief of Procurement and Supply with officials of [redacted]

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[redacted] It now needs the signature of a representative of the Navy Department, but first it must receive the routine approval of the Armed Services committees of Congress. The lease begins on 1 March 1953 and is renewable from year to year at the option of the government. The annual rental will be [redacted]

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(b)(3)

16 January 1953 - A meeting is held in the Office of the Chief of Procurement and Supply (Mr. Garrison) before a proposed trip to [redacted] to study costs at the site. It is agreed best to go ahead with a minimum amount of construction to get the job under way, with expansion taking place later if necessary. Housing is being planned for [redacted] people. In answer to [redacted] question about housing for families, Mr. Garrison states that no survey of this has

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been made.

19 January 1953 - DTR initiates requests for the communica-

tions and medical personnel deemed necessary for [redacted]

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Logistics and security officers are also being sought for
the project.

23 January 1953 - The Navy Department is making plans to handle

the public relations aspect of this project when the lease
is approved by the Congressional Committees.

31 January 1953 - Mr. Baird, Colonel White and Mr. Garrison

have returned from [redacted] where they spent two days ex-
amining the site. On-the-spot agreement was reached on

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construction problems affecting housing and messing; it
appears that the original Navy estimates can be considerably
reduced. The House Armed Services Committee is expected
to approve the lease shortly; the Senate Committee is not
yet ready to consider it.

6 February 1953 - A TDY of about four months in the [redacted]

area is being arranged for [redacted] to give him first-
hand experience in current clandestine maritime operations.

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(b)(3)

Only one instructor assigned to Maritime Training has any
clandestine operational experience, and his experience is
not recent.

9 February 1953 - On this date, Senator Saltonstall notifies

the Secretary of Defense that the Senate Armed Services

Committee is withholding its approval of certain real estate

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transactions until the new administration has indicated that it considers them essential.

10 February 1953 - The Navy has been advised that the Agency does not want nominations of regular Navy officers to fill the vacant job of Commandant, [] and to provide a replacement for the Chief of Maritime Training [] will have served three years by July 1953). Action is being taken instead to find qualified persons within CIA.

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16 February 1953 - Logistics problems are forecast at []. The existing pier is not suitable for loading or unloading supplies. The project does not yet have an assigned supply officer.

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18 February 1953 - Word has been received that the House Armed Services Committee has approved the lease.

24 February 1953 - The Navy disapproves the request that Lt.

[] USNR, be recalled to active duty
for assignment to []

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3 March 1953 - On this day, Mr. Dudley of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and Captain Nixon of the Bureau of Ordnance, meet with Congressman King of California, at the request of the House Armed Services Committee. Mr. King needs an explanation of the nature and necessity for the BuOrd installation, because he has been receiving mail from his constituents that requires an answer. Mr. King shows no interest in the classified aspects of the project, and does not intend to oppose it. He has been considering holding public hearings, however.

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4 March 1953 - The Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Armed Services sends a letter to the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks telling him that the Subcommittee on Real Estate and Military Construction has approved the Project, notwithstanding some reservations as to the maintenance of adequate security. "The Subcommittee accepted the assurance of Navy Department representatives that adequate security can be provided under the contemplated arrangement, but it is desired that you be fully advised of the Subcommittee's concern over the project." This communication has been signed by Senator Saltonstall.

5 March 1953 - The Navy Department signs the lease.

3. The Termination of Interest in [redacted]

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The men in the Office of Training who had worked so long to acquire a training site may well have thought for a brief moment that their troubles were over. Not so!*

At the same time that the lease was signed, the Navy Department made a public announcement to the effect that a Naval installation was to be activated in one specified part of [redacted]

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[redacted] for experimental ordnance work of a classified nature, with some restrictions to be imposed on contiguous waters. The following day (6 March) the Under Secretary of the Navy, Charles S. Thomas, informed Colonel White that the press announcement had caused a

*The story of the following hectic days can be pieced together from the DTR's weekly reports to the Director and from a memorandum for the record by Colonel White, dated 10 March 1953.

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violent reaction from Congressmen and individuals on the West Coast. He said that he did not like to yield to pressure, and if it was absolutely essential for this project to be initiated, the Navy would do so. But it could hurt the Navy badly on the West Coast, and he requested that the Agency position be re-examined and that there be absolute certainty that no other location would be suitable. Colonel White agreed to this re-examination.

The same day, an officer from the Navy Office of Information came to Mr. Dulles' office with a proposed press release, saying that Mr. Thomas felt that he must issue another press release without delay, inasmuch as there had been such a violent reaction from fishermen and yachtsmen who would have no place to anchor in that area. Colonel White then worked out a press release with the press officer. This announcement appeared the next day, 7 March, saying in effect that no further development of the property at that location would be undertaken pending a re-examination for absolute necessity.

On 9 March, Mr. Baird and [redacted] met with the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Anderson, and with the Under Secretary, Mr. Thomas. Mr. Anderson strongly urged that the Agency not proceed with the project. He said that he would appoint an officer immediately to assist the Agency in every possible way to find another site and to develop it. Mr. Anderson also said that if the Navy went ahead with the present project, it would be forced to hold public hearings in at least five towns, including Los Angeles.

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This might even lead to a full-scale Congressional investigation. The public reaction had been unprecedented, and even if all obstacles could be overcome, the hostile attitude of the local citizens would make successful operation of the project extremely difficult. As an interesting footnote to this situation, it should be mentioned that, during the meeting, Secretary Anderson indicated that neither his office nor that of the Chief of Naval Operations had any prior knowledge of this project!

At the conclusion of this meeting, Mr. Baird called [redacted] to let [redacted] know about these developments and express the Agency's willingness to make any reasonable settlement, since it would now be unwise to proceed with the project. After talking to [redacted] Mr. Baird then called Colonel White to convey the news that [redacted] were not inclined to accept this turn of events and in fact had prepared a rather strong press release of their own which they proposed to issue the next day. Under Secretary Thomas then took his turn at trying to explain the situation to [redacted] Mr. Baird later reported that [redacted] was extremely disappointed and had completely failed to understand the Navy's position. He seemed to feel that it was the Navy and not CIA which had caused this unpleasant and undesirable turn of events.

The records show that numerous other telephone calls were flying back and forth on this particular day. Among others, Mr. Thomas advised Colonel White that the White House was putting on pressure to get the matter settled. He therefore requested

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permission to issue a statement that the project would be located elsewhere. This was agreed to. And the final call of the day was one to Mr. Frank Wisner from [redacted] who indicated that he believed that the public would resent the yachtsmen and fishermen who were putting pressure on the Navy to cancel the lease. He hoped that the Navy's press announcement of the cancellation of the project could be delayed for several days.

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Colonel White summarized the situation for the DCI in a memorandum of this same day, 9 March. He pointed out that it would be unwise to proceed without the willing support of the Navy, and that insistence on holding to the original agreement might seriously jeopardize the Agency's over-all relations with the Navy. But any further delay in this project (18 months having already gone by) would cause not only a serious curtailment of planned operations but would also create a morale problem to the Naval personnel on duty with the Agency and working on this project.

The Navy press release of 10 March 1953 said that the Navy would not use [redacted] and that "the [redacted] ordnance project previously planned there will be transferred to another site."

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CHAPTER III. Project [redacted]

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(b)(3)1. The Search for Another Training Site

The following day, 11 March 1953, Navy and Agency representatives (from Training and Logistics) met to discuss alternate sites. Only one location appeared to be reasonably suitable. [redacted]

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[redacted] Plans were made for a party to survey the area about 19 March.

[redacted] was surveyed 23-26 March by the following team: Capt. E. E. Saunders from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, [redacted] and [redacted] from Maritime Training Branch of OTR, and [redacted] from the Coordination and Requirements Staff of the Office of Logistics. This group's attention was also given to

[redacted] This group specifically recommended the acquisition of [redacted] for [redacted] *

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By mid-April 1953, the decision was made in OTR to locate

*As of 17 March, the basic requirements for a maritime training site had been given not only to the Navy, but to the Army and the Air Force as well, and all three services were presumably trying to identify a suitable base from among those under their control.

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the maritime training in [redacted] and the DCI's approval
 was asked by the DTR in a memorandum dated 13 April 1953.

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Col. White (the Assistant DD/A) replied to this on 17 April,
 stating that the Director had approved in principle, but
 would withhold final approval until after the proposal had
 been fully staffed out to show feasibility, costs and other
 data, in comparison with the costs of [redacted]. This memorandum
 directed the Office of Logistics to develop detailed cost
 estimates in conjunction with the Office of Training.

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The next two months were occupied with the assembly of
 cost figures and with the making of a choice between [redacted]
 and [redacted]. The Office of Logistics favored the latter,
 (basing this view on the survey made in March), but OTR wanted
 the former. The Acting Chief of Logistics, in a memorandum of
 5 May 1953 to the Director of Training, specifically recommended
 the choice of [redacted]

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The DTR's reply on 8 May presented numerous arguments for
 [redacted] Contrary to the opinion of the Office of Logistics,
 he said, there should be no difficulty in [redacted]
 [redacted] The DTR did not believe that the
 additional costs of using [redacted] would be as great as the
 Office of Logistics had implied. Furthermore, the OTR experience
 with conducting training at [redacted] had been a convincing
 demonstration of the undesirability of operating a CIA facility

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within a military installation, and the proposed arrangement at [redacted] would be even less favorable than the one at [redacted]. In conclusion, the DTR urged that [redacted] be confirmed as the location of the project, and that the implementation proceed as quickly as possible.

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At this same time, OTR was also evidently having a little difficulty with the Clandestine Services over the site selection, as evidenced by a memorandum written by DTR to the DD/P, Mr. Wisner, on 29 April 1953. The DTR expressed surprise to hear that the DD/P was unaware of recent developments on Project

[redacted] inasmuch as both the DCI and the DD/A were fully informed and [redacted] (DD/P Administrative Officer) had attended meetings on this subject. The DTR described the negotiations being conducted with the Navy to acquire the site as approved by the DCI, and pointed out that the acquisition of the site as well as the subsequent modification and construction were the specific responsibility of the Office of Logistics, with which the Office of Training was in daily communication. He said that the training requirements which had been firmed up by [redacted] (the Chairman of the Clandestine Services Training Committee) had been given to the Office of Logistics.

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The DTR also said in this memorandum that [redacted] had recently made a presentation urging that a site [redacted] be considered for maritime training, but that this had [redacted] been rejected as being less suitable for staff officer training

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than [redacted]

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Several days later, [redacted] had suggested a site in

[redacted] which was being used at the time for other purposes.

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This suggestion had been rejected because it was deemed unsuitable from the hydrographic viewpoint. The DTR ended his letter by apologizing for not having kept the DD/P informed and said in conclusion:

"May I take this opportunity of suggesting that I would be glad formally to inform your Office of all training developments, and in turn hope that you will inform me of any training requirements from the offices under your jurisdiction."

2. The Development of [redacted](b)(1)
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[redacted] was officially replaced as Chief of Maritime Training on 18 May 1953 by [redacted] a civilian employee of CIA with a Navy background, who reported to OTR just in time to take on the problem of establishing [redacted] in [redacted]. About the same time, the Navy agreed to recall his right-hand man, [redacted] to active duty with the rank of Commander, effective 1 July 1953. He was to be the Commanding Officer as well as the Senior Instructor at [redacted] as soon as the project received final approval.

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During the week of 18-22 May 1953, an inspection party which included Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted] (Security Officer) from OTR, and [redacted] from the Real Estate Division of the Office of Logistics, met with Navy representatives

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in [redacted] where they examined [redacted] and [redacted] (b)(1)
 [redacted] to obtain an estimate of the cost of setting up a (b)(3)
 maritime training base. Their findings were reported to the (b)(1)
 DD/A on 8 June. The cost of establishing a base at [redacted] (b)(1)
 was estimated at [redacted] which was about half of what the (b)(3)
 [redacted] base would have cost initially, but [redacted] more than (b)(1)(3)
 the estimate for [redacted]. The cost, after establishment, (b)(3)
 would be about the same for [redacted] and for [redacted] (b)(1)
 Of the three sites, [redacted] was felt to be clearly (b)(1)
 superior for training purposes. [redacted] was unacceptable (b)(1)
 for security reasons; only classroom work could be done there. (b)(3)
 The inspecting party felt that [redacted] could also be used (b)(1)
 for Agency activities other than maritime training, and in (b)(3)
 their opinion, the area was superior to [redacted] for training (b)(1)
 purposes. On the basis of cost, suitability for training pur- (b)(3)
 poses, and security, [redacted] was recommended by the inspecting (b)(1)
 party. It offered beaches and other geographic features, a pier, (b)(3)
 dependent housing, and buildings suitable for instruction, admin-
 istration, and recreation.

At this point in time, events speeded up, as indicated by
 the weekly reports and various memoranda.

15 June 1953 - DTR submits a staff study to the DCI recom-

mending the establishment of the base at [redacted] with (b)(1)
 an estimated initial cost of [redacted] based on the (b)(3)

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instruction of [] staff personnel twice a year and a holding area for [] indigenous agents. The base would furnish facilities for three purposes: (1) to train staff and indigenous personnel in clandestine maritime in-exfiltration and sabotage; (2) to test and develop specialized equipment and doctrine; (3) to conduct dry runs of projected maritime operations.

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18 June 1953 - The Clandestine Services Training Committee presents a substantially reduced estimate of the number of students to be trained in Fiscal Year 1954. The expectation is now for [] staff employees and [] agents.

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23 June 1953 - TSS reaffirms to OTR its urgent need for a facility where it can test maritime devices.

24 June 1953 - The DTR, in a memorandum to the Assistant DD/A, presents a revised cost estimate of [] for [] in view of the latest, but drastically lowered, requirements for training.

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26 June 1953 - General Balmer, Chief of the Planning and Program Coordination Staff, informs DTR that the Project Review Committee has given tentative approval to the revised project, and that he is personally convinced that [] is justified.

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5 July 1953 - [] departs PCS for []

24 July 1953 - Project [] is approved by the DCI.

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9 August 1953 - Messrs. Baird and [] accompanied by (b)(3)

two members of the DD/A's staff, leave for a week's visit
at [] (b)(1)
(b)(3) (b)(3)

28 August 1953 - [] men have now left for [] PCS. (b)(1)
(b)(3) (b)(3)

11 September 1953 - [] is leaving soon for [] (b)(1)(b)(3)
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to confer with local Army and Navy authorities. The
Commandant of [] and the local (b)(1)
(b)(3)
Commanding General have been informed of the establish-
ment of [] and that the Army is to grant a use (b)(1)
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permit for this site.

17 September 1953 - []

[] (b)(1)
(b)(3)

30 September 1953 - Support of the Project is encountering
problems because of existing federal legislation.

Civilians are required to pay for the shipment of their
privately owned automobiles, and for the storage of
household effects in the U. S. The feasibility of
integrating civilian employees into the Navy is under
discussion.

5 October 1953 - The Assistant Secretary of the Navy has
approved the additional Navy and Marine positions

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requested for [redacted] bringing the authorized military strength up to [redacted] officers and [redacted] enlisted men.

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5 October 1953 - [redacted] meets with members of the principal staffs of the Clandestine Services to review the proposed training program and insure its responsiveness to training requirements.

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3. The Termination of Interest in [redacted]

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As in the case of the attempt to set up the project at [redacted] the fatal blow to the plans came just as it must have seemed that the desired end was about to be reached.

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The Director of Training, Matthew Baird, had left Washington on 11 September 1953 for a visit (his first) to [redacted] and other training installations [redacted] accompanied by [redacted] (Chief of the Resistance Training Branch of OTR) and [redacted] (Training Officer of the FI Staff of DD/P). After his return on 5 October, he discussed the use of [redacted] with Gen. Cabell, the DDCI.

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On 8 October the DDCI suggested to the DD/P an immediate re-examination of maritime requirements and the physical establishments on [redacted] and [redacted] with a view to the possible abandonment of [redacted] and the concentration of maritime training in [redacted] * Mr. Wisner, the DD/P, in

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[redacted] seems to have been suggested first by [redacted] in April 1953. See above, page 33.

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reporting this to his Chief of Operations, Mr. Helms, on 12 October, recalled that [redacted] was recommended to the DCI "before the recent developments of drastically lowered personnel and financial ceilings." Because of these sharp reductions, Mr. Wisner felt that [redacted] would be found unduly expensive and that it would not be used to the extent originally contemplated. He said that this was also the view of the Director of Training.

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At the request of the Director of Training, the Clandestine Services Training Committee went to all the Staffs and Divisions to get their views on the choice of a base for maritime training. The results were reported to the Chief of Operations, DD/P, by the Committee Chairman on 14 October. It was the Committee's understanding that the proposal to use [redacted] for this training stemmed from the fact that [redacted] was not being fully utilized at this time.

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According to the Committee report, the FE Division felt that [redacted] provided not only a "convenient" (sic) location, but also excellent climatic and hydrographic conditions. As for the other Divisions of DD/P, their requirements for maritime training as presented in June 1953 had been wiped out by the recent reductions in available money and personnel, as well as by the more relaxed international situation. The Staff Chiefs were against moving

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the program to [redacted] because of security problems, the limited facilities, and the high cost in time and money.

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The CS Training Committee therefore came to the conclusion that [redacted] was the best place for the program, taking into consideration the need for a place for research and development and for the acquisition of training experience in this field by OTR.

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The Committee's findings were of no avail. On the

same day, 14 October 1953, a long meeting was held, with

Richard Helms, [redacted] Desmond Fitzgerald, and [redacted]

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[redacted] representing DD/P, and Matthew Baird, [redacted]

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[redacted] and [redacted] from OTR. The following

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conclusions were reached: in view of the recent ceilings and the reduced threat of war, there are not sufficient requirements for maritime training outside the FE area to justify setting up an Agency-wide maritime training facility;

FE Division requirements can be met [redacted] the Office of

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Training will have no further responsibility for maritime training other than that which can be offered in Washington

and at [redacted]. The following day, 15 October 1953, the

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DDCI directed Mr. Baird to cancel [redacted] and to study the

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feasibility of offering limited maritime training in

Washington, at [redacted] with the addition of advanced

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maritime training at [redacted] when needed.

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A few days later Mr. Baird took off for [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) where he had the unenviable job of breaking the news of the cancellation of the project to the Commandant [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) [redacted] and to the [redacted] men and [redacted] wives who were (b)(3)
already at work at the site. He reported on his return that, although the disappointment was generally severe, several of the Navy enlisted men said that they had gone so far already with the program that they would like to continue in it in whatever way they could serve. By 19 December 1953, [redacted] was able to report that he had successfully (b)(3)
terminated all activities at the [redacted] site, with re- (b)(1)
(b)(3) maining personnel released and with all supplies and equipment enroute to Headquarters.

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CHAPTER IV. The Development of Alternatives:

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The Maritime Training Branch lost no time in adjusting to the new situation. On 16 October 1953, the Branch Chief, [redacted] forwarded to the DTR a proposal for a new curriculum to replace that which had been planned for [redacted]. His plan called for a four-week course which could be given by four instructors, with classroom work in Washington, followed by exercises and problems at [redacted]. Field instruction in underwater swimming and maritime sabotage would not be attempted. OTR should continue to develop maritime doctrine along with training materials.

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By the end of November 1953, arrangements had been made for the release of most of the [redacted] personnel. The Maritime Training Branch had been slimmed down to [redacted]

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During this same period, October-November 1953, Mr. Baird was deeply involved in the planning of maritime training at [redacted]. Many conferences and memoranda were necessary to reach a consensus regarding the responsibilities and relationships of all the interested parties --- The DDCI, the Director of Training, the DD/P, the Chief of

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FE Division, the Chief of TSS, the Chief of [redacted]

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[redacted] and the Chief of the Training Base. The

result of this work was a DDCI memorandum of 17 November

1953 to the Chief of [redacted] spelling out

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the relationships and announcing that maritime training

was to be conducted at [redacted]

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Following this announcement, [redacted] was promptly

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sent to [redacted] for several weeks to survey the maritime

training facilities and the instruction being given at that

location. His findings were reported to the DTR on

9 December 1953. He found that a maritime training section

as such did not exist. Two instructors taught a course

entitled "Beach Reconnaissance" when there were students who

needed this particular subject. He felt that conditions on

[redacted] permitted training in small boat handling through

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surf, underwater sabotage, underwater swimming, seamanship,

navigation and the like. He concluded that maritime training

could be given on [redacted] but it would be limited for a number

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of reasons, and he suggested that basic instruction be given

in Washington and [redacted] using [redacted] as an area for

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advanced training.

[redacted] discussed his findings with the Chief, FE

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Division and the Chief, [redacted] on 16 December 1953.

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His report of 29 December on this conference indicates that

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the Chief, FE agreed that maritime training should be conducted at [redacted] saying that there were [redacted] (b)(b)(3)
(b)(3) staff employees at various field posts who should have this training and whom he would arrange to send to [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) as soon as a course was ready for them. He did not know if there would be any other requirement. He thought that maritime equipment needed for [redacted] operations should be stored in [redacted] (b)(1)
(b)(3) His students could be trained in the use of this equipment and then request that it be shipped to their posts as needed. He asked the Chief, [redacted] to find out how many other trainees the Division could make available for this training. On the basis of this conference, [redacted] recommended to the DTR that the Maritime (b)(3)
Training Branch be directed to prepare a course for presentation at [redacted] by the end of May 1954. He proposed that it be five weeks in length, have a maximum of [redacted] students, and emphasize in-exfiltration and maritime sabotage. (b)(1)
(b)(3) (b)(3)

As a result, a "Field Maritime Operations Course" was prepared and actually conducted at [redacted] from 6 July 1954 to 6 August 1954, by [redacted] and [redacted] (b)(1)
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[redacted] with the assistance of base personnel. It was intended primarily for field case officers, but as late as the middle of June, only [redacted] had been nominated, with an additional [redacted] from Headquarters. Because of the obvious lack of (b)(3)
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requirement, as well as the unsuitability of [redacted] for this type of training, the course was never given again for Americans at that location.

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During the first three months of 1954, the Maritime Training Branch was busily engaged in writing training materials for the [redacted] course, and otherwise preparing for "Maritime Operations Course #1," which began in Washington on 5 April with [redacted] students. In addition,

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[redacted] and [redacted] spent some time assisting TSS in a testing program, while instructors [redacted] and [redacted] took the Air Operations Course and [redacted] helped instruct in a CE Course.

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The second Maritime Operations Course began on 1 June 1954 with [redacted] students, a number of whom were from the permanent staff of [redacted]. At the end of this running, it was decided that the third presentation (scheduled for 27 September) would be conducted entirely at [redacted] rather than trying to do half of the course in Washington. This course then became the prototype of all maritime training at [redacted]

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The meager demand for the Operations Courses and the [redacted] Course was a confirmation of long-standing OTR concern over requirements. The DTR had addressed a lengthy memorandum to the DDCI on 7 December 1953 (just at the time [redacted] was surveying the potential of [redacted] on the

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subject of "Maritime Training." He noted certain expensive failures that had taken place in maritime operations because they had been run by inexperienced individuals who had had no training in this field. And he pointed out that the entire OTR training effort in the maritime field in the previous two years had consisted of a classroom orientation provided to staff employees and foreign nationals.

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He called attention to the apparent inability of the Clandestine Services to project accurate training requirements or to release their people to meet these requirements.

Before OTR could proceed with a maritime training program, said Mr. Baird, it needed answers to certain fundamental questions:

- a. the extent to which the Agency is engaged in clandestine maritime operations, and the extent to which it will be engaged in the future;
- b. how many individuals in each of the foreign divisions are presently qualified to undertake the task of planning, directing, or participating in clandestine maritime operations;
- c. does this pool of trained maritime operators constitute the entire Agency requirement for such personnel?

The DTR came to the conclusion in this paper that "it may be assumed" that the Agency would be engaged in maritime operations and would need personnel trained in that field. The memorandum

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ended with the recommendations that the DD/P be requested to provide OTR with a statement of the number of employees to be trained for maritime operations, and that the DD/P establish a procedure to make sure that these people would get the needed training.

General Cabell promptly sent Mr. Baird's memorandum to the DD/P with a request for recommendations for Agency action. He stated that Mr. Baird's assumption about the Agency's engaging in maritime operations was correct, in his opinion, and he specifically requested that the DTR be provided with an estimate of requirements for training. The DD/P responded on 30 January 1954 by saying that the Chief of the Paramilitary Operations Staff had been asked to prepare a comprehensive analysis of the maritime operational situation by 1 May 1954, with this survey providing the base for specific and meaningful requirements. The extant files do not indicate that OTR received much significant information as a result of this effort.

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CHAPTER V. The Human Side

In reconstructing the history of this period, it is easier to find plans, costs, requirements and estimates in the files than to learn much about the people involved -- their frustrations, their contributions, their conflicts. But the attitudes and reactions of the people working on [redacted] were an important part of that Project, and this human side was set forth in a number of documents.

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The understandably low state of morale in March 1952 is reflected in two papers dated 14 March. On this date [redacted] requested a transfer to operations (later explained as based on professional considerations, not personal dissatisfaction). [redacted] endorsed this request favorably, saying that [redacted] talents were being misused, and the expectation that they would ever be used was remote. He added darkly, "The recent default of certain officials with regard to their responsibilities in the maritime field further accentuates this conclusion."

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[redacted] also requested on the same date his own reassignment in the Agency or else a return to the Navy. Addressing his memorandum to the DCI, with a copy to the Bureau of Naval Personnel, he stated that "responsible officials have been unable to reach a decision" about establishing an adequate program, and that he had not been properly

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employed. He did not see how any progress in the development of this training could be expected in the foreseeable future.

[redacted] noted on one of these papers, "In the light of the whole situation, I believe that the Maritime Training Branch should be transferred to the Air-Maritime Division (of DDP)." But the Branch remained in OTR and so did [redacted] and [redacted]. On 23 May 1952, [redacted] [redacted] again requested release either to the Navy or to Agency field operations, citing his dissatisfaction with the progress of the [redacted] project, and pointing out that he, a specialist in under-water operations, was doing nothing but planning and administrative work.

By some means or other, both men were persuaded to stay until the summer of 1953. But a greater personnel crisis developed in November 1952 than any that had gone before. On 26 November (the day the Director had been expected to make a final decision about [redacted] and just after Mr. Wolf had called for a complete re-study), [redacted] the Acting Chief of MTB, wrote a memorandum to the DTR, recommending that [redacted] members of the Branch be returned to the Navy or to other parts of the Agency, that all personnel being processed for the Branch be cancelled, and that the remainder [redacted] [redacted] be the only ones retained. He stated that he had prepared this memorandum after consultation with [redacted] [redacted] The reason he gave was the lack of adequate support

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within the Agency for an effective maritime training program.

On the same day, 26 November, [redacted] submitted a separate memorandum requesting release on the grounds that neither his time nor his abilities had been used effectively since he first reported in August 1951, and that "It has been repeatedly demonstrated that there is no recognized requirement for maritime training in general, to say nothing of a specific requirement for instructors" with highly specialized skills.

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[redacted] also wrote a personal memorandum on the same day, in which he stated that he had been thoroughly disillusioned after three months in the Agency, citing as factors such bureaucratic problems as: unclear missions, delays in obtaining decisions, lack of long-range planning, and paralysis of operations by administrative procedures. This memorandum probably reflected accurately the reaction of regular Navy officers to the Agency's way of doing business at that time. It is obvious that on this particular day, emotions were at a dangerous point, and OTR officials did not lose any time in dealing with the situation. [redacted] and at least [redacted] other officers were given written releases the same day, November 26.

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[redacted] summed up his views two months later in a memorandum of 21 January 1953, written to the Director of Training. In this letter, he pointed out that he had been ordered to duty with CIA in July 1950 at CIA's request, in

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spite of his objections for professional and personal reasons. But once assigned, he had attempted to perform his duties to the best of his ability. He had wanted to terminate the relationship on several occasions, but each time felt obliged to subordinate his own desires to the best interests of the government. He did not concur with a recent suggestion that his services could now be dispensed with, feeling that to leave before his mission was accomplished might alienate the Navy's support of the program. Allegations had been made that his way of carrying out this program was not compatible with the organization and functioning of CIA; while these allegations were not without foundation, he did not consider himself completely inflexible in his methods if the achievement of results required some modification of his ways.

[redacted] cited the "frequent shuffling" of Armed Services personnel into and out of the Agency as having caused him great difficulty. He stated that of the [redacted] officers of various ranks, both regular and reserve, from three separate services who were assigned to his own office, [redacted] requested release and return to the parent service within a short time after reporting. He claimed that he personally dissuaded [redacted] others from leaving. [redacted] did not specify the reason for their leaving, but he evidently felt that the Agency was dissipating its fund of good will in the military establishment; there is an implication that the men who left could not tolerate the Agency's way of handling the Project. In conclusion, he

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questioned the advisability of requesting Navy personnel for this and comparable programs.

On 2 February 1953, the Military Personnel Division was advised by OTR that it was willing to release [redacted] to the Navy for reassignment in June or July 1953.* His three-year tour was due to end on 4 August. Before the end of February, [redacted] received orders detaching him in June 1953. The fitness report written on him by Matthew Baird on 16 April 1953 gave him highest marks, stressing his courage, leadership, loyalty and tenacity, and saying that [redacted] had completed an important project "under conditions of stress and frustration which would have broken the spirit of a lesser officer." He had worked under four Chiefs of Training -- [redacted]

[redacted] Mr. Kingsley, and Mr. Baird -- at a time when the Office of Training as well as the rest of the Agency was going through a series of rapid organizational changes.

Soon after [redacted] left, OTR also lost [redacted] who had been with Maritime Training since September 1951. He was released to the Navy Department on 1 July 1953, upon his return from his TDY in [redacted]

*This willingness to release [redacted] was expressed just at the time when it appeared that the lease of [redacted] property was practically settled.

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His report to the DTR, dated 25 June 1953, presents a rather appalling description of the way the maritime operations which he saw were being conducted; apparently conditions had not changed much in the two years that had elapsed since

[redacted] visit in 1951, as he had described them in (b)(3)

an equally critical report. According to [redacted] the (b)(3)

organization for the maritime support of covert operations

[redacted] presented a "sad picture," and he expressed great (b)(1)
concern over the lack of men trained in maritime activities. (b)(3)

Many of the points he made in his lengthy report were incorporated in subsequent training lectures. Just at the

time he returned, the new site of [redacted] was finally selected. (b)(1)

At about the same time, [redacted] gave some in- (b)(3)

sight on the human side in a memorandum which he wrote to the Deputy Director of Training (Special) on 12 June 1953, while

waiting for the approval of the use of [redacted] and move (b)(1)
to it. On that date there were [redacted] civilians and [redacted] (b)(3)

Navy men on board, with [redacted] more civilians and [redacted] Navy men (b)(3)(3)

in process. He described all of these men as highly qualified

and highly motivated, having made personal and financial sacri-

fices in the interest of [redacted]. The Navy men had had more (b)(1)

inconvenience than the others; they had lost their incentive (b)(3)

pay, had trouble about housing, run into security problems,

and suffered by being out of touch with the Navy environment.

Nevertheless, they and the civilians professionally recognized

"the pathetic lack of maritime thinking within the Agency" and

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stood ready to develop a waterborne capability. Their morale remained high. The setback sustained when [redacted] was cancelled was miraculously survived, according to [redacted]

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[redacted] but he predicted that if this should happen a second time, the people on board as well as those in process would all be lost. The high degree of cooperation shown by the Bureau of Personnel in making requested persons available could hardly be expected to continue indefinitely. Furthermore, the assistance rendered by a number of Navy Department bureaus and offices had been of the highest value to CIA, and as an asset could not be treated lightly.

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These remarks were made a few months before the use of [redacted] was cancelled. The entire history of [redacted] was characterized by such a high degree of frustration that it is a tribute to the men concerned with it that they maintained any morale at all. The tensions and personal problems that went with much of the Agency work in this period have been documented and illuminated to an unusual degree in the records of Project [redacted]

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SECRETCONCLUSION

The problems encountered during the effort to establish a maritime training program have been related in detail because they provide an excellent case history to illustrate what the Office of Training was facing in its formative period, 1950-1954. Some of these difficulties would not have occurred in a later and more sophisticated period; they arose because the Agency and the Training Office did not have either the people with the needed specific experience or the organization with established procedures, duties and responsibilities to cope effectively with the problems. In retrospect, it is hard to believe that as late as 1952 the Director of Training and his staff were independently negotiating a lease for

[redacted] and working out cover arrangements with the Navy Department with very little guidance or support from security, logistics, or cover specialists.

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But the problem of providing administration and support for the Project was not as significant a factor as two other problems which were basic in the [redacted] case. The first of these was the question of requirements (which actually consisted of three questions):

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- a. Was the training needed?

[redacted] in November 1949 asked operating officials if there was a requirement for Agency people

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to be trained in maritime activities. Three years later, in November 1952, Mr. Baird was officially asking the same question. He asked it again in November 1953. But during this entire period (1949-1954), no authoritative answer to this question was forthcoming, nor could it be, given the lack of long-range planning and policy direction which evidently prevailed at this time. The files of this time suggest that the DDCI, the DD/A, and the OTR were more concerned with maritime training than the Deputy Director for Plans, who was not personally aware, for example, of the steps being taken by these others to acquire another site after the loss of [redacted]

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The Chiefs of Training had to depend on staff elements (Staff II, The CS Training Committee, AMD) to answer the basic question. Using the available data, OTR made the assumption that the training was needed. It then became essential to get the answer to another question.

b. How many people needed the training?

The number of trainees to be expected was critical for this Project, but from the beginning it was impossible to get meaningful figures. The estimates which were provided changed so frequently that there is no way now to tell from the records what the basis for OTR planning was at any particular time. All of the

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Chiefs of Training kept raising the question of numbers to be trained, and went ahead, using the estimates provided. But these estimates seem to have had a flimsy basis. On the day that [redacted] was cancelled (14 October 1953), the CS Training Committee reported that the area divisions were unable to furnish specific requirements or estimate the number of students to be trained.

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(b)(3)c. What did the trainees need to learn?

What skills did they need to acquire? What would they be called upon to do? Who was to provide the doctrine? Most of the OSS experience and know-how seemed to have been lost; it was of doubtful applicability, in any case. OPC offered to prepare training manuals, but found that it was not able to do so. The Navy's approach was not primarily geared to the support of clandestine operations. In July 1951, OTR organized its own "Doctrine Development Staff," but the job of devising doctrine and preparing manuals still fell to the individual instructors, who in the case of maritime operations were unable to find out what operations were being run or contemplated, with what equipment.

The Maritime Training Branch did its best at the outset to fill in its own gaps in knowledge and experience by observing training [redacted] in the U.S. Navy schools, and by observing operations [redacted]. But

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the operating elements of the Agency were unable to provide any substantial guidance as to what their people should be taught.

The second critical problem presented to OTR by [redacted] was the procurement of qualified instructors. Ideally, an instructor should have had in his background both operational and teaching experience. Hopefully, he should have had one or the other. Some OTR instructors have had neither. For [redacted] the Navy and Army seemed to be the only source of supply of instructors. But this arrangement left much to be desired, as [redacted] recognized in January 1953 (after more than two years in the Project), when he questioned the advisability of requesting Navy personnel for the [redacted] Project.

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After 1952, support problems gradually became manageable, as Agency routines became established and as specialists in such fields as logistics and security became more available to OTR to provide the assistance needed. The procurement of instructors in the field of clandestine operations continued to be a basic problem until 1968, when a workable solution seemed to be reached after years of frustration for OTR. But the problem of requirements, so well illustrated by the [redacted] history, has never been solved, although appearing possibly less critical in 1969 than in 1950-54. Through the years, it has had a direct impact on every part of OTR.

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In retrospect, the history of [redacted] and the early days of maritime training gives an over-all impression of an aggressive and eager young Office of Training, under the leadership of men

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with OSS experience, convinced that it should be offering maritime training for the support of clandestine operations, pushing a reluctant (or maybe confused) Agency in the direction of providing trainees and a site for a program for which there was no really recognized requirement, and no model to go by.

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APPENDIX A

A NOTE ON SOURCE MATERIAL

The information in this historical paper has been drawn almost entirely from documents in the Office of the Director of Training or on deposit at the Record Center. In all cases, they have been identified in the narrative.

There has been a minimum reliance on interviews, other than the checking of details with knowledgeable individuals.

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